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Pandemic Hope for Chapter 11 Financing
David Skeel

abstrac t. The pandemic revealed that the increasing complexity of debtor’s capital struc-

ture could supply much-needed competition in the Chapter 11 ﬁnancing market, as other inside
lenders increasingly challenge a debtor’s favored inside lenders. A�er discussing the beneﬁts of
this surprising development, the Essay identiﬁes several impediments and oﬀers strategies for
removing them.

A�er Neiman Marcus, the luxury department store, ﬁled for Chapter 11 in
May 2020, two diﬀerent groups of lenders vied to provide bankruptcy ﬁnancing. Neiman’s managers had arranged a $675 million lending package with a
group of its ﬁrst lien lenders prior to bankruptcy and requested approval for
that group to provide the ﬁnancing at the outset of the case. 1 Another investor
group, which included Mudrick Capital Management and Third Point, quickly
countered with a $700 million loan proposal. 2 The competing investors oﬀered
a lower interest rate and a diﬀerent strategy for resolving Neiman’s ﬁnancial
distress. 3
1.

2.

3.
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See, e.g., Mike Spector & Jessica DiNapoli, Exclusive: Neiman Marcus Creditor Calls for Deal
with Saks Fi�h Avenue - Letter, REUTERS (May 12, 2020, 8:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-neinmanmarcus-m-a-saksﬁ�havenue-exc-idUSKBN22P035 [https://perma.cc
/Y5B8-Q5KD].
See Objection to Debtors’ Emergency Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing the Debtors to (A) Obtain Postpetition Financing and (B) Utilize Cash Collateral,
(II) Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties, (III) Modifying the Automatic Stay, (IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing, and (V) Granting Related Relief at 1, In re
Neiman Marcus Grp., No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 7, 2020) [hereina�er Mudrick
Objection], [https://perma.cc/XF6L-2UGF] (describing the counterproposal and objection
by Mudrick Capital).
The Mudrick/Third Point proposal called for Neiman to solicit buyers and shi� to a traditional Chapter 11 restructuring only if Neiman did not receive a credible oﬀer during a nine-
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Neiman’s choice of lenders for its operations in bankruptcy was quite remarkable in two respects. First, Neiman had ready access to ﬁnancing, as reﬂected in its receiving two diﬀerent ﬁnancing oﬀers. The economy was shut
down due to COVID-19, and there had been ominous signs in the ﬁnancing
market. Only a few weeks earlier, Sanchez Energy, a company already in bankruptcy at the outset of the pandemic, announced that it was unable to repay its
bankruptcy loan. 4 Some commentators were warning that a crisis in the lending market might be imminent. 5 But Neiman had little trouble obtaining a
sizeable new loan. Its ﬁnancial advisor “acknowledged that the proposed [ﬁnancing] is ‘certainly unusual’ in the sense that the debtors are obtaining ﬁnancing despite the company largely not operating at the moment given the
store closures amid the Covid-19 pandemic.” 6
Why was so much ﬁnancing available to Neiman? In part because equity
funds and other potential investors had an estimated $2.5 trillion of available
funding (i.e., “dry power”) at the outset of the crisis, due to a perceived dearth
of attractive investment opportunities. 7 The unexpected buoyancy of the stock
market also contributed. The large amount of federal money available under
the CARES Act and other stimulus funding may have played a role, too, although that money could not be used for bankruptcy loans. 8

4.

5.
6.

7.
8.
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ty-day auction period. See, e.g., Neiman Marcus Group LLC $700 Million Superpriority
Senior Secured Debtor in Possession Credit Facility Term Sheet exhibit A to annex I, in
Mudrick Objection, supra note 3, at 37.(Neiman Marcus Group LLC $700 Million Superpriority Senior Secured Debtor in Possession Credit Facility Term Sheet) (milestone calling
for ﬁnal auction bids within 90 days).
See Andrew Scurria & Aisha Al-Muslim, Bankruptcy Loans Turn Dangerous, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
8, 2020, 8:03 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bankruptcy-loans-turn-dangerous-11586
347202 [https://perma.cc/Z67D-J72E].
Id.
See Neiman Marcus Receives All Requested First Day Relief, Including Interim DIP Financing
Approval over Objections from Mudrick, Marble Ridge, Others, REORG (May 8, 2020, 8:37 PM),
https://reorg.com/neiman-marcus-receives-all-requested-ﬁrst-day-relief-including-interimdip-ﬁnancing-approval-over-objections-from-mudrick-marble-ridge-others [https://perma
.cc/37Z2-29HD].
For discussion of this factor and those that follow, see Part I, infra.
The $500 billion lending program in the CARES Act that was designed for large businesses
was linked to the Federal Reserve’s emergency-lending power under section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act, which precludes loans to borrowers that are in bankruptcy. See, e.g.,
David Skeel, Bankruptcy and the Coronavirus: Part II, BROOKINGS INST. 7 (July 2020), https:
//www.brookings.edu/research/bankruptcy-and-the-coronavirus-part-ii [https://perma.cc
/G72B-HNWZ] (describing the limitation on borrowers in bankruptcy). The Paycheck Protection Program, which initially authorized up to $660 billion in loans to smaller businesses,
did not explicitly prohibit loans in bankruptcy, but it was administered by the Small Business Administration, which does. Id.

pandemic hope for chapter 11 financing

The other remarkable feature of Neiman’s access to ﬁnancing was that two
diﬀerent bidders oﬀered to provide the “debtor-in-possession” ﬁnancing. 9 In
most cases, a debtor has a single source of funding, usually from its principal
prebankruptcy lenders.10 The willingness of multiple lenders to provide DIP
ﬁnancing for Neiman may have stemmed in part from the conﬂuence of the
developments just described: large amounts of investable funds, a buoyant
stock market, and the federal stimulus money.
But another, underappreciated factor also came into play: a striking shi� in
the capital structure of many corporate debtors. Capital structure is increasingly disaggregated. 11 Companies o�en borrow not just from one group of lenders—as with a syndicated loan in which a variety of lenders have stakes—but
from multiple groups of diverse lenders, o�en under arrangements that give
one group a ﬁrst lien on the debtor’s assets and the other a second lien. 12 RadioShack, in an early illustration of this trend, had two major groups of secured
lenders, with an agreement between the two groups and separate agreements
within each group. 13
In this Essay, I argue that this trend could help solve a serious, longstanding problem in the market for DIP ﬁnancing. In the past, the senior lenders of
most corporate debtors were banks or a single syndicate of banks and other
lenders. 14 Because of the information asymmetry between the debtor’s princi-

9.

The term, which is quite nonintuitive to those who are not bankruptcy experts, comes from
the fact that bankruptcy law deems the debtor and its managers to be a “debtor in possession”—that is, a debtor that has authority over its assets—when the debtor ﬁles for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2018) (providing the powers of a debtor in possession). If the
debtor obtains ﬁnancing for its operations in bankruptcy, the funds are thus debtor-inpossession (DIP) ﬁnancing.
10. See B. Espen Eckbo, Kai Li & Wei Wang, Rent Extraction by Super-Priority Lenders 4 (Tuck
Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 3384389, 2020) (citing evidence that 80% of bankruptcy ﬁnancing comes from the debtor’s current lenders); Frederick Tung, Financing Failure: Bankruptcy Lending, Credit Market Conditions, and the Financial Crisis, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 651,
655 n.13 (2020) (noting that in a sample data set of debtor-in-possession loans, 75% of
bankruptcy ﬁnancing came from debtors’ current lenders).
11. See generally Kenneth Ayotte, Why Do Bankrupt Firms Have Such Complex Capital Structures,
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Dec. 20, 2018), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/12/20/whydo-bankrupt-ﬁrms-have-such-complex-capital-structures [https://perma.cc/6EMR-QF2F]
(noting and speculating about possible reasons for the recent increase in capital-structure
complexity).
12.

For further discussion of ﬁrst- and second-lien arrangements, see Section III.A, infra.
13. See Salus Cap. Partners, LLC v. Standard Wireless Inc. (In re RadioShack Corp.), 550 B.R.
700, 703 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016).
14. See, e.g., Douglas R. Gooding & Jonathan D. Marshall, Bankruptcy Is Uncharted Territory for
Unitranche Lenders, J. CORP. RENEWAL (Sept. 2018), https://turnaround.org/jcr/2018/09
/bankruptcy-uncharted-territory-unitranche-lenders
[https://perma.cc/M9AU-2G3M]
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pal lenders (who have more and better information about the debtor) and outside lenders (who have less and worse information), outside lenders are discouraged from competing to ﬁnance corporate debtors. The eﬀects of the information asymmetry are magniﬁed by a “debt overhang” problem: because
some of the beneﬁts of any new ﬁnancing will accrue to the existing lenders,
new lenders are unlikely to oﬀer ﬁnancing unless they are given priority over
the existing lenders. 15 The vast majority—75% or 80%—of DIP loans come
from the debtor’s existing lenders, and these lenders consistently earn supracompetitive proﬁts, which suggests that the obstacles to alternative ﬁnancing are severe. 16
Due to the fragmentation of ﬁrms’ capital structures, many corporate debtors now have at least two groups of lenders, and sometimes more. Neiman
Marcus, for example, had ﬁve diﬀerent substantial groups of secured lenders.17
Although the new capital structure complexity has potential downsides, 18 it also has a signiﬁcant upside: it can provide a solution, or at least the beginning
of a solution, to the lack of competition for DIP ﬁnancing. Rather than outside
lenders, a diﬀerent source of alternative ﬁnancing—other inside lenders, who
do not face the same information asymmetries as outsiders—may challenge the
favored insider lenders. Neiman’s ready access to ﬁnancing and choice between
multiple potential lenders could become a much more common experience
among corporations ﬁling for Chapter 11. Even the possibility that an alternative bid may emerge could force a debtor’s lenders to oﬀer a more competitive
rate for bankruptcy ﬁnancing.
As the discussion above reﬂects, the descriptive and normative claims in
this Essay draw on a rich literature about bankruptcy ﬁnancing.19 This Essay is
the ﬁrst to point out that the solution—or at the least, a partial solution—to
(“When the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, the assets of a typical debtor were encumbered
by a lien held by a single secured creditor.”).
15.

See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 149-55 (1977).
Eckbo et al., supra note 10, at 4 (80% of loans from insiders); id. at 28 (supracompetitive
proﬁts); Tung, supra note 10, at 655 n.13 (75% of loans from insiders).
17. See infra note 49 and accompanying text (noting that Neiman had ﬁve substantial groups of
lenders and an additional $100 million loan).
18. Focusing on debt overhang rather than information asymmetries, Professors Ayotte and Ellias show that a ﬁrst- and second-lien structure can discourage lower-priority creditors from
competing with a DIP-ﬁnancing oﬀer from the ﬁrst liens if the second-lien lenders are not
permitted to receive a priming lien. Kenneth Ayotte & Jared A. Ellias, Bankruptcy Process for
Sale, 39 YALE J. ON REGUL. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 23-32, 57-59), https://ssrn
.com/abstract=3611350 [https://perma.cc/2FPL-86M8].
19. See Tung, supra note 10; Eckbo et al., supra note 10; Ayotte & Ellias, supra note 18. A key earlier contribution in a similar vein is Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor
Control and Conﬂict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 514 (2009).
16.
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these concerns may lie in plain sight: in the fragmentation of debtors’ capital
structures.
Unfortunately, three features of current bankruptcy practice may prevent
this optimistic scenario from emerging. First, courts have been reluctant to
grant nonconsensual “priming” liens—that is, liens that take priority even over
the liens of existing lenders—which are needed to solve debt overhang problems. 20 Second, the intercreditor agreements that ﬁrst and second lienholders
enter into sometimes prohibit second lienholders from providing bankruptcy
ﬁnancing absent consent by the ﬁrst liens, thus stymieing a potential alternative source of funding. 21 Finally, the debtor and key creditors o�en enter into a
restructuring support agreement (RSA), 22 which may preclude any of the signatories from oﬀering alternative ﬁnancing. As a result, the RSA may preempt
competition to provide ﬁnancing.
It is important not to overstate the impediments. Even if courts continue on
their current track, the number of competing DIP ﬁnancing oﬀers seems likely
to increase. Although courts have been reluctant to award nonconsensual priming liens, the lucrative fees in this market are likely to entice other lenders in
the capital stack of debtors with fragmented capital structures to challenge favored bids, putting pressure on courts to take these bids more seriously. By
more carefully scrutinizing contractual provisions that interfere with competitive oﬀers, or by amending bankruptcy law to encourage more competition,
courts and lawmakers could spur even more competition.
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the surprising abundance of funding during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Part II, the focus turns to
the striking shi� in the capital structure of many corporations that later ﬁle for
bankruptcy, and the potential for this shi� to increase the competitiveness of
the bankruptcy-ﬁnancing market. Finally, Part III analyzes potential impediments to a more competitive market for bankruptcy ﬁnancing and proposes
potential correctives for each. Much of Part III is devoted to judicial scrutiny of
the obstacles to a competitive lending market, but it also considers the possibility of amending bankruptcy law to address courts’ reluctance to grant priming
liens and loan provisions that stymie potential competing loans.

20.

Priming liens, which are authorized by 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1) (2018), are discussed in Part II,
infra.

21.

This is discussed in detail in Section III.A, infra.
22. A restructuring support agreement (RSA) binds its signatories to the terms of a reorganization plan consistent with the terms they have negotiated. RSAs and their implications for ﬁnancing are the focus of Section III.B, infra.
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an abu ndance of bankruptcy financing

When the COVID-19 crisis worsened in early 2020, causing the American
economy to shut down, it seemed to augur a surge in Chapter 11 ﬁlings and a
potential liquidity crisis as corporate debtors struggled to obtain bankruptcy
ﬁnancing. 23 During the Great Recession of 2008-2009, this is more or less
what happened. In fall 2008, at the height of the crisis, access to bankruptcy ﬁnancing evaporated for a few months, and corporate bankruptcies more than
doubled.24
The COVID-19 pandemic had the potential to be even worse than the Great
Recession, given the breadth of the economic shutdown. At ﬁrst, the shutdown
seemed to destabilize the DIP ﬁnancing market. Sanchez Energy, which had
ﬁled for bankruptcy before the crisis, announced it would be unable to pay its
bankruptcy loan. 25 The prospect of a default, an uncommon occurrence with
DIP ﬁnancing, 26 and uncertainty as to how long the economic shutdown
would last pointed to the possibility of major turmoil in the ﬁnancing market.
Yet turmoil never materialized. Since the pandemic began, large corporate
debtors have had ready access to ﬁnancing. The most remarkable example was
Hertz, which considered ﬁnancing its bankruptcy by selling stock a�er a surge
of speculative trading signiﬁcantly increased the stock price. 27 Were it not for
the disapproval of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Hertz might not
have needed a loan at all. 28 In the Neiman Marcus bankruptcy, two diﬀerent

23.

I was among those who warned of a potential wave. See David Skeel, Bankruptcy and the
Coronavirus, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research
/bankruptcy-and-the-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/3FLX-9DLJ]. A large group of bankruptcy scholars sprang into action early in the pandemic, forming working groups to propose responses to a bankruptcy wave. See, e.g., Letter from Jared A. Ellias, Chair, Large
Corp. Comm. of Bankr. & COVID-19 Working Grp., to Mitch McConnell, U.S. Sen., Chuck
Schumer, U.S. Sen., Nancy Pelosi, U.S. Rep. & Kevin McCarthy, U.S. Rep. (June 10, 2020)
(on ﬁle with author) (advocating for measures to expand the capacity of the bankruptcy system).

24.

Business bankruptcy ﬁlings jumped from 28,322 in 2007 to 60,837 in 2009. The statistics are
available at Annual Business and Non-Business Filings by Year, 1980-2020, AM. BANKR. INST.,
https://abi-org.s3.amazonaws.com/Newsroom/Bankruptcy_Statistics/Total-BusinessConsumer1980-Present.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7TK-U3ME].

25.

See Scurria & Al-Muslim, supra note 4.
Id.

26.
27.

See, e.g., Dan Runkevicius, How Hertz Fooled Amateur Investors, FORBES (July 1, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danrunkevicius/2020/07/01/how-hertz-htz-fooled-amateurinvestors [https://perma.cc/79FW-FZMT].
28. Id.
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groups of lenders competed to provide ﬁnancing. 29 Overall, debtors obtained
roughly $20.762 billion of DIP ﬁnancing in 2020 amid the pandemic—over $5
billion more than debtors obtained in 2019. 30
Why so much ﬁnancing? One explanation is the estimated $2.5 trillion of
“dry power” that distressed debt funds had at the outset of the pandemic. 31
With attractive investment opportunities scarce, funds had accumulated capital. Potential lenders were unusually well-positioned to make bankruptcy loans
due to this quirk of the lending environment.
In addition to this private investment, the federal government pumped an
enormous amount of federal money into the economy during the pandemic,
both through legislative interventions such as the $2.1 trillion CARES Act,
which directed funding to joint eﬀorts of the Federal Reserve and Treasury, and
through independent Federal Reserve programs. 32 Because these programs
generally could not be used for bankruptcy loans, 33 federal money did not directly enhance access to DIP ﬁnancing. Still, it appears to have increased liquidity for corporate debtors in indirect ways. For instance, the abundance of federal funds may have diminished funding opportunities for private lenders outside
of bankruptcy, encouraging them to provide bankruptcy loans.
Like federal funding, the strength of the stock market throughout the pandemic may have also indirectly aﬀected access to DIP ﬁnancing. Many troubled
corporate debtors appear to have been able to avoid bankruptcy altogether
without borrowing money due to the ease of raising capital by selling stock. 34
AMC Theatres is a vivid illustration. Though it was an obvious candidate for
Chapter 11 early in the pandemic, it proceeded to raise $1.2 billion through eq-

29.

See Parts II and III, infra, for a detailed discussion of the Neiman Marcus bids.
My thanks to David Smith for these numbers, which he compiled from information in the
Deal database. See Email from David C. Smith, Professor of Com., Univ. of Virginia, to David Skeel, Professor of Corp. L., Univ. of Pennsylvania (June 7, 2021, 2:37 PM) (on ﬁle with
author).
31. The $2.5 trillion number comes from Edith Hotchkiss, Greg Nini & David C. Smith, Corporate Capital Raising During the COVID Crisis 9 (Nov. 1, 2020) (unpublished manuscript)
(on ﬁle with author). Eliot Ganz and David Smith had noted early in the pandemic that
there was an unusual amount of funding available for companies experiencing bankruptcy.
Elliot Ganz & David Smith, It’s Not Time for a Government Bankruptcy Facility, REALCLEAR
MTS. (June 15, 2020), https://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2020/06/15/its_not_time
_for_a_government_bankruptcy_facility_496152.html [https://perma.cc/22LW-ZV2G].
30.

32.

For a discussion of federal-economic stimulus provided through the CARES Act and the
Paycheck Protection Program, see note 8, supra.

33.

Id.
34. See, e.g., Emily Flitter, Matt Phillips & Peter Eavis, How the Stock Market’s Relentless Rise
Saved Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/business
/stock-market-banks.html [https://perma.cc/7W4M-MNUC].
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uity issuances in a single quarter. 35 In addition to indirectly boosting the DIP
ﬁnancing market by diminishing lending opportunities outside of bankruptcy,
stock-market strength directly contributed to the robust market for the new
stock of corporate debtors when they exited bankruptcy. 36
Finally, another less obvious factor enhanced access to DIP ﬁnancing: the
increased complexity of corporate debtors’ capital structure due to ﬁrst- and
second-lien arrangements and other new ﬁnancing structures, as discussed earlier and in more detail in the next Part. Compared to the $2.5 trillion in available funding and the massive amounts of federal aid, this capital-structure shi�
is less dramatic and was perhaps less important during the pandemic. 37 But as I
argue in Part II below, the new capital structure has major implications for the
future of Chapter 11.
ii.

the new cap ital structure: multiple ins ide lenders

When the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, the bankruptcy-ﬁnancing
provision was one of its key innovations. 38 The provision sharply expanded
debtors’ ability to obtain ﬁnancing by empowering bankruptcy judges to provide sweeping protections for lenders who agree to ﬁnance debtors’ operations
in bankruptcy—including a “priming lien” that has priority even over existing
secured creditors. 39
If DIP ﬁnancing functioned like the competitive markets taught in Economics 101, early entrants into the market would have made supracompetitive

35.

Matt Phillips, AMC Cashes in on Meme Stock Mania, Raising $587 Million, N.Y. TIMES (June
3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/03/business/amc-meme-stock.html [https://
perma.cc/U9A9-WEZ7].

36.

See, e.g., Ciara Linnane, Bankrupt Hertz’ Stock Soars 62% on News of Deal to Exit Chapter 11
that Will Beneﬁt Shareholders, MARKETWATCH (May 13, 2021, 2:48 PM ET), https://www
.marketwatch.com/story/bankrupt-hertz-shares-soar-62-on-news-of-deal-to-exit-chapter11-that-will-beneﬁt-shareholders-11620845287 [https://perma.cc/2DTS-8UDT] (describing
plans for the sale of newly issued Hertz stock in connection with its reorganization).
37. See discussion supra note 30 and infra Part II.
38.

For a historical overview, see David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-inPossession Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1905 (2004).

39.

See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2018). If unsecured ﬁnancing is not available, the lender can be given an
administrative priority, which is a claim that generally must be paid in full in cash at the end
of the case. See id. § 1129(a)(9). Alternatively, or in addition to administrative priority, the
lender can be given a lien on some or all of the debtor’s assets. The ﬁnal and most dramatic
option is a “priming” lien with priority even over existing liens if existing lienholder’s interests are “adequately protected.” As discussed at the end of this Part and the beginning of Part
III, the bankruptcy court’s priming-lien authority will be essential to fostering a more competitive DIP ﬁnancing market.
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proﬁts, which would have declined as the market matured. But this did not
prove to be the case. Recent evidence suggests that DIP lenders continue to
make extraordinary proﬁts. One study, for example, found that lenders charge
several percentage points higher than a competitive interest rate. 40 Another
concluded that DIP loans are priced similarly to junk debt, despite being far
less risky. 41
The key to understanding the stickiness of DIP lenders’ supracompetitive
proﬁts lies in another feature of the market: 75% or more of DIP loans are
made by the debtor’s current lender.42 The dominance of insider lenders stems
from two factors that discourage competition. The ﬁrst is information asymmetries. Because a debtor’s existing lender has better information about the
debtor, it is diﬃcult for a new lender to compete. 43 Second, the inside lender
o�en has a lien on all the debtor’s assets; one study found that 75% of bankruptcy debtors obtain senior secured ﬁnancing before bankruptcy and the loans
are secured by all of the debtor’s assets 97% of the time. 44 Unless the court
grants a priming lien, a new lender’s loan may subsidize the existing lender at
the expense of the new lender, since the existing lender has the ﬁrst claim on
any value created. This eﬀect—debt overhang—may further discourage new
entrants. 45
If the debtor has a single lender or syndicate of lenders, the obstacles to obtaining ﬁnancing from any lender other than the current lender may be insurmountable. If the debtor’s existing lender has oﬀered to provide new ﬁnancing,
a new entrant will be competing with a lender that has better information and
an existing relationship with the debtor, and it may suspect that the debtor will
be reluctant to take a chance on a new lender. Even if the existing lender declines to supply additional funding, a new entrant may still be reluctant to oﬀer
ﬁnancing, given the adverse signal sent by the current lender’s refusal to make
another loan.
With current corporate debtors, however, the traditional pattern of a single
lender or syndicate of lenders o�en does not apply. A debtor’s ﬁnancing is
much more likely to be fragmented. 46 A key development has been the in-

40.

Eckbo et al., supra note 10, at 28-29 (supracompetitive proﬁts).

41.

Tung, supra note 10, at 686 (comparable to junk bonds).
Eckbo et al., supra note 10, at 41 (80%); Tung, supra note 10, at 655 n.13 (75%).

42.
43.

See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider, 80 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1557, 1579-85 (2013) (discussing information asymmetry (or “adverse selection”) issues).
44. Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 19, at 513-14.
45.
46.

See Myers, supra note 15, at 149-55.
For a similar point, see Gooding & Marshall, supra note 14.
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creased use of ﬁrst- and second-lien arrangements in which a group of lenders
holds a ﬁrst lien on the debtor’s assets and another group holds a secondpriority lien.47 The ﬁrst and second lienholders o�en enter into an “intercreditor” agreement that speciﬁes their rights vis-à-vis one another. Less common
but somewhat similar are “unintranche” arrangements, which have a similar
priority arrangement but are framed as single loan rather than separate ﬁrst
lien and second loans. 48 Some corporate debtors have even more groups of senior lenders. Neiman Marcus had ﬁve separate collateralized loans ranging from
$561.7 million to $2,253.1 million at the time of bankruptcy, including both second- and third-lien loans. 49 Each group may itself be comprised of a variety of
lenders, ranging from distressed debt funds to traditional commercial banks.
This fragmentation of corporate debtors’ borrowing can have problematic
eﬀects. Intercreditor agreements among the parties, 50 or the lien structure itself, 51 can interfere with an eﬃcient restructuring process. But the fragmentation also has an important and underappreciated potential upside: it ensures
that the debtor has multiple inside lenders, rather than just one. This creates
the possibility of lending competition from within the debtor’s capital structure. The shi� in debtors’ capital structure suggests that improved competition
and a more eﬃcient lending market actually may come not by encouraging outside lenders to provide DIP ﬁnancing, as one might assume; it may come from
other inside lenders instead.

47.

An early discussion of second liens marveled at the “exponential increase in the number of
second lien ﬁnancings in the senior bank loan market.” Neil Cummings & Kirk A. Davenport, A Primer on Second Lien Term Loan Financings, 2004 COM. LENDING REV. 11.
48. For a discussion of unitranche loans, see Gooding & Marshall, supra note 14; and Andrew
Hedlund, Rise in Private Credit Leads to Boost in Unitranche Loans, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2020,
2:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/unitranche-size/rise-in-private-credit-leads-toboost-in-unitranche-loans-idUSL1N2AJ15Q [https://perma.cc/VDN9-W8C9] (“Seven unitranches of at least US$1bn have been extended in 2019 and the opening months of 2020,
according to Reﬁnitiv LPC data.”).
49. It also had a smaller, $100 million secured loan. See, e.g., Debtors’ Emergency Motion for
Entry of Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing the Debtors to (A) Obtain Postpetition
Financing and (B) Utilize Cash Collateral, (II) Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition
Secured Parties, (III) Modifying the Automatic Stay, (IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing, and
(V) Granting Related Relief at 22, In re Neiman Marcus Grp., No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. May 7, 2020) [hereina�er Neiman Marcus DIP Financing Motion] (listing Neiman’s
obligations).
50.

The intercreditor agreements entered into between ﬁrst-lien and second-lien creditors may
create externalities, for instance, or have the eﬀect of silencing a key constituency. See Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy on the Side, 112 NW. U. L.
REV. 255, 284-86 (2017).

51.

See Ayotte & Ellias, supra note 18, at 23-32 (describing the possibility that second lienholders
may not oﬀer ﬁnancing in the absence of a priming lien).
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The Nieman Marcus bankruptcy illustrates the potential pattern. When
Nieman ﬁled for bankruptcy, it had arranged for $600 million of new ﬁnancing
from a group of existing lenders, including Paciﬁc Investment Management
Co., Davidson Kempner Capital Management LP, and TPG’s Sixth Street Partners. 52 An investor group that comprised investment ﬁrm Mudrick Capital
Management LP and Third Point LLC countered with an oﬀer to lend $700
million at a lower interest rate and signiﬁcantly lower fees than the favored
lenders’ loan. 53
Mudrick Capital was not a random outside lender that saw Neiman Marcus
as an attractive lending opportunity. To the contrary, Mudrick Capital already
had a stake in Neiman Marcus, holding $144 million of its ﬁrst-lien loans.54
Mudrick was thus an inside lender. Prior to Neiman’s bankruptcy, Mudrick had
pressed its managers to pursue a sale or merger with Saks Fi�h Avenue.55
Mudrick’s proposed loan reﬂected its vision for Neiman’s future. A key condition of the competing proposal was that Neiman Marcus would be required to
ﬁrst seek a sale of its assets, before attempting to reorganize its ﬁnances and
operations. If no credible bidder emerged, Neiman Marcus could try to achieve
a traditional reorganization. 56
Neiman and its preferred lenders fended oﬀ the Mudrick threat by appealing to courts’ traditional reluctance to protect a new lender with a priming
lien. 57 Neiman argued that it would not be possible to provide adequate protection of the preferred lenders’ liens, which the DIP ﬁnancing provision requires
as a prerequisite for approving a priming lien. According to Neiman’s principal
bankruptcy lawyer, a “non-consensual priming ﬁght is not a ﬁght that we could
win.” 58 Neiman’s and its lawyer’s not-so-subtle point was that, because Neiman
and the favored lenders had no intention of agreeing to a priming lien giving

52.

See, e.g., Mike Spector, Svea Herbst-Bayliss & Jessica DiNapoli, Exclusive: Investors to Challenge Neiman Marcus Bankruptcy Loan, Push for Sale - Sources, REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2020, 10:06
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-neimanmarcus-bankruptcy-exclusive-idCAKCN
22905E [https://perma.cc/US8M-56CH].
53. Mudrick’s loan would have been at 11% interest, and it vowed to charge one-half the backstop fees of the favored lenders’ loan. See Mudrick Objection, supra note 2, at 10-11.
54. Id. at 1.
55.

See Spector & DiNapoli, supra note 1.
56. Mudrick Objection, supra note 2, at 10. Under Mudrick’s $700 million proposal, $100 million would be set aside to pay some of Neiman’s existing lenders. Id.
57. Consistent with the conventional wisdom, Ayotte and Morrison found that “80 percent of
priming liens involve the DIP lender priming itself,” and their data did not reveal what portion of the rest involved consensual priming liens. Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 19, at 525.
58.

See REORG, supra note 6 (quoting comments of Chad Husnick of Kirkland & Ellis at the
First Day Orders hearing).
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Mudrick priority over their liens, the Mudrick bid could not be approved unless the court conducted a valuation hearing to determine whether Neiman’s
assets were suﬃcient to ensure payment of the favored lenders despite their
subordination to a new priming lien; any eﬀort to demonstrate “adequate protection” would fail, they claimed. This seems to have been suﬃcient to dissuade the court from seriously considering the Mudrick alternative. Although
the court described the preferred lenders’ loan as “expensive money” and
mused that “[w]e all wish that Neiman Marcus could get a [Paycheck Protection Program] loan and that it would be free,” it rejected Mudrick’s challenge
and approved the preferred loan. 59
As the Neiman battle reﬂects, genuine competition in the DIP lending market will depend on courts’ willingness to grant nonconsensual priming liens in
appropriate cases. Given that corporate debtors invariably have few unencumbered assets, alternative lenders face debt overhang issues and priming liens
will o�en be essential. 60 One reason for optimism that bankruptcy courts will
indeed show more willingness to grant priming liens if an increasing number
of alternative-ﬁnancing oﬀers emerge from within debtors’ capital stack is that
the presence of a concrete alternative oﬀer reduces the risk of a disastrous outcome if the court denies the favored lenders’ proposal. When debtors and their
preferred lenders ask the court to approve a DIP ﬁnancing proposal at the outset of the case, they o�en claim that the debtor is desperate for cash and will
collapse if a proposed loan is not approved; in the absence of an alternative
source of funds, bankruptcy judges are understandably reluctant to call their
bluﬀ. 61 The threat is much less credible if an alternative lender has oﬀered to
provide funding.
Of course, inside lenders are not all similarly situated. A distressed-debt investor that has recently acquired a portion of a senior or junior loan will have
less of an information advantage than a single bank that has been a ﬁrm’s longtime lender and provides all of the debtor’s banking services. This diﬀerence in
status may be reﬂected in the terms of the loans the new insiders oﬀer. A newly
arrived distressed-debt investor may be more likely to seek to impose strict limitations on the debtor’s options in bankruptcy, for instance, to minimize the

59.

Id.
60. Other commentators also have emphasized the need for greater access to priming liens. See,
e.g., Ayotte & Ellias, supra note 18, at 57-59 (advocating for blanket use of two-to-three
month priming liens).
61.
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See generally Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 882-83 (2014) (describing the diﬃculty and
rarity of challenging proposed bankruptcy sales supported by just enough DIP ﬁnancing to
fund the sale process).
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risk of the loan. 62 The new lender may also be more willing to provide exit ﬁnancing—that is, new ﬁnancing for the debtor as it emerges from bankruptcy—given that it will have the beneﬁt of all the information produced by the
bankruptcy case when it oﬀers to make an exit loan (assuming the exit ﬁnancing oﬀer is made during or at the end of the case, rather than at the outset).
To be sure, increased competitiveness in the DIP ﬁnancing market would
bring costs as well as beneﬁts. If a debtor’s relational bank or other senior lenders anticipate competition from other lenders if the debtor ﬁles for bankruptcy,
this may aﬀect their behavior prior to bankruptcy. For instance, they may be
quicker to insist that the debtor put a chief restructuring oﬃcer in place to protect their interests. Lenders might also impose a higher interest rate to oﬀset
the loss of potential DIP ﬁnancing proﬁts. Although the prospect of bankruptcy lending competition is probably not salient enough to aﬀect loans to ﬁnancially healthy debtors, it might impact struggling debtors.
Despite these potential costs, genuine competition in the DIP ﬁnancing
market would almost certainly improve the eﬃciency of the bankruptcy process. In addition to the burden of paying supracompetitive interest rates, the
risk that favored lenders and a debtor’s managers will make deals that beneﬁt
one or both at the expense of the company and its other constituencies is quite
high when the company falls into ﬁnancial distress. 63 A competitive ﬁnancing
market would help to address both concerns. A momentous unintended consequence of the increased complexity of corporate debtors’ capital structure is
that it makes ﬁnancing market competition much more likely.
iii.

impediments to competitive financing

The story this Essay has told thus far is an optimistic one. Bankruptcy ﬁnancing was far more abundant during the pandemic than expected. Moreover,
the shi� in debtors’ capital structure suggests that DIP ﬁnancing will be more
competitive a�er the pandemic than it was before, at least among ﬁrms with
fragmented capital structures.
The most obvious impediment to a more competitive lending market is
courts’ reluctance to grant nonconsensual priming liens. Unlike the consensual
62.

Note that Mudrick’s proposed DIP ﬁnancing for Neiman Marcus had this quality. It would
have required that Neiman attempt to quickly sell its assets, likely to Saks Fi�h Avenue. See
supra note 3 (describing the ninety-day timeline for an auction); Spector & DiNapoli, supra
note 1 (describing Mudrick’s call for Neiman to consider a sale to Saks). But the preferred
loan in Neiman also circumscribed the debtor’s options.
63. Ayotte and Ellias consider, among other things, the possibility that current lenders may use
their DIP loans to protect against fraudulent conveyance or preference challenges. Ayotte &
Ellias, supra note 18, at 32-37.
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priming liens a debtor’s existing lenders o�en give to themselves—with a new
DIP loan priming their prebankruptcy loan—a nonconsensual loan requires a
bankruptcy judge to determine at a valuation hearing that the earlier loan will
be adequately protected. A thawing of this reluctance is essential to the emergence of a competitive lending market, given the debt-overhang issues that discourage new lenders from making loans without an assurance of priority. As
discussed in the last Part, there are grounds for cautious optimism that this
thawing could in fact occur. 64
But two additional impediments could interfere with the emergence of a
more competitive DIP ﬁnancing market. First, intercreditor agreements sometimes contain provisions that explicitly preclude potential lenders from making
bankruptcy loans. Second, the restructuring support agreements that have become a key feature of many Chapter 11 cases may indirectly achieve the same
preclusive eﬀect, by committing potential lenders to a reorganization strategy
that incorporates the preferred lenders’ DIP loan. In this Part, I discuss these
impediments and propose solutions for each.
A. Explicit Restrictions on Financing
When a corporate debtor borrows under a ﬁrst- and second-lien ﬁnancing
arrangement, the ﬁrst and second lienholders o�en use an intercreditor agreement to allocate their rights vis-à-vis one another. One standard term gives ﬁrst
lienholders the exclusive right to enforce the parties’ rights in their collateral.65
More aggressive restrictions may preclude the second liens from objecting to a
reorganization plan supported by the ﬁrst liens or may prohibit the second
liens from providing DIP ﬁnancing absent consent from the ﬁrst lienholders. 66
64.

See supra text accompanying notes 60-61. The problem also could be addressed legislatively.
To increase judges’ willingness to grant priming liens, for instance, the bankruptcyﬁnancing provision could be amended to require that the bankruptcy court hear preliminary
evidence about the value of the company’s assets and the scope of the favored lender’s liens
before rejecting an alternative-ﬁnancing proposal that oﬀers better terms than the favored
loan. This would diminish the force of claims by the debtor that the court can avoid valuation issues by simply approving the favored loan.

65.

See infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing this provision in the context of In re
MPM Silicones, LLC (Momentive), 518 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014)).

66.

The American Bar Association’s Model First Lien/Second Lien Intercreditor Agreement includes a “compromise” provision, which prohibits the second lienholders from oﬀering DIP
ﬁnancing secured by liens equal or superior to the ﬁrst lienholders’ liens unless the ﬁrst
lienholders have not oﬀered to provide DIP ﬁnancing. Comm. on Com. Fin., Am. Bar Ass’n
Section of Bus. L., Report of the Model First Lien/Second Lien Intercreditor Agreement Task
Force, 65 BUS. L. 809, 857 (2010) (“No Second Lien Claimholder may provide DIP Financing to a Borrower or other Grantor secured by Liens equal or senior in priority to the Liens
securing any First Lien Obligations[], provided that if no First Lien Claimholder oﬀers to
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The last of these provisions—the loan prohibition—is of concern here. It is
not diﬃcult to see why ﬁrst lienholders might wish to have such a provision.
Much as the second lienholders could undercut the ﬁrst liens by objecting to a
reorganization plan favored by the ﬁrst liens, or by supporting a plan opposed
by the ﬁrst liens, 67 providing ﬁnancing also could interfere with the ﬁrst
lienholders’ objectives. A loan from the second liens could prolong the case at a
time when the ﬁrst lienholders want to force a sale or other quick resolution.
If the second lienholders are trying to prolong the case and divert value
from the ﬁrst lienholders, a loan prohibition might be justiﬁable. But the risk
that a DIP loan will be used to divert value does not seem great. Oﬀering to
make a DIP loan would be a cumbersome way to divert value, given that it requires a substantial new investment from the second lienholders. To be sure,
the investment would be compensated, but it is a substantial upfront expenditure nonetheless. Moreover, it seems more likely that a loan prohibition will be
used to divert value from other creditors to the ﬁrst lienholders than it is that a
loan from the second lienholders will divert value from the ﬁrst liens. Of particular importance for present purposes, the uncertain beneﬁts of the loan prohibition come at the cost of cutting oﬀ one of the most promising potential
sources—perhaps the most promising source—of alternative funding.
Loan prohibitions can be analogized to two other provisions that limit a
debtor’s options in Chapter 11: prebankruptcy stay waivers and ipso facto
clauses. Stay waivers are usually negotiated by a debtor and its lender as part of
an out-of-court workout of a loan; in return for the lender’s forbearance, the
debtor agrees not to oppose a motion to li� the stay if the debtor subsequently
ﬁles for bankruptcy. 68 An ipso facto clause makes the debtor’s insolvency or
bankruptcy an event of default under a contract. 69 Courts are skeptical of stay
waivers, but sometimes enforce them if other creditors have notice of their proprovide DIP Financing to the extent permitted under section 6.1(a) on or before the date of
the hearing to approve DIP Financing, then a Second Lien Claimholder may seek to provide
such DIP Financing secured by Liens equal or senior in priority to the Liens securing any
First Lien Obligations, and First Lien Claimholders may object thereto[].”).
67.

A battle between the senior and junior liens in the Momentive case centered on the question
whether the junior liens’ support for a plan opposed by the senior liens violated the parties’
intercreditor agreement. Judge Drain sided with the junior liens, concluding that the agreement only gave the senior liens control over the collateral, and did not limit the junior liens’
right to take contrary positions on issues that did not directly implicate the collateral. In re
MPM Silicones, 518 B.R. at 751-52.

68.

See Marshall E. Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice, and Law,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 301, 304 (1997); James T. Marcus & John F. Young, Enforcement of PrePetition Waivers of the Automatic Stay, 26 COLO. LAW. 47, 47 (1997).
69. See, e.g., Yeon-Koo Che & Alan Schwartz, Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Ineﬃcient Continuance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441, 454-55 (1999) (criticizing the Bankruptcy Code’s
invalidation of ipso facto clauses).
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visions. 70 Ipso facto clauses are invalidated by several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 71
Although the consequences of a loan prohibition are less severe than with a
stay waiver, loan prohibitions actually are more problematic. The context
where courts have tended to uphold prebankruptcy stay waivers is small businesses whose lender has a security interest in all of the debtor’s assets. 72 A large
majority of small businesses are not viable when they ﬁle for Chapter 11 and
end up liquidating, with most or all of the value of the business going to the
principal lender if there is one and little recovery for other creditors.73 Waiving
the stay so that the lender is able to foreclose on the debtor’s assets therefore is
not likely to impose externalities on other creditors, and courts generally do not
enforce waivers if other creditors will be harmed. 74
Loan prohibitions are more similar to ipso facto clauses in this regard than
to the stay waivers that courts generally enforce. An ipso facto clause may deprive the debtor of a contractual relationship or of the ﬁnancing it needs to eﬃciently resolve its ﬁnancial distress. Loan prohibitions in intercreditor agreements impede ﬁnancing in similar fashion. Each undermines the purpose of
Chapter 11, which is to provide a collective forum that enables the parties to
preserve the going-concern value of a business if the business is viable when
the debtor ﬁles for bankruptcy. 75 A stay waiver that does not aﬀect the interests
of creditors other than the debtor’s principal lenders does not raise the same
concerns.

70.
71.

Tracht, supra note 68, at 311-13.
11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e), 541(c)(1)(B) (2018).

72.

See Tracht, supra note 68, at 312 (“Nearly all of the published cases on contractual waivers of
speciﬁc bankruptcy rights address waivers of the automatic stay granted to a secured creditor during a prepetition workout.”). See generally Mark A. Cody & Mark G. Douglas, A Brief
Guide to Automatic Stay Waivers, Bankruptcy Remoteness, and Bad Boy Guarantees, JONES DAY
(July/Aug.
2016),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2016/08/a-brief-guide-toautomatic-stay-waivers-bankruptcy-remoteness-and-bad-boy-guarantees [https://perma.cc
/9JWS-HRXP] (providing background on automatic-stay waivers).
73. See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2330-40 (2005) (demonstrating that typical Chapter 11
debtors are small businesses whose businesses are not viable when they ﬁle for bankruptcy).
74.

See, e.g., Cody & Douglas, supra note 72 (noting “whether other parties are aﬀected” as a factor that courts consider in determining whether to enforce a stay waiver).

75.

The classic exposition is THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
(1986).
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The same point can be made another way: liquidity is essential to the reorganization process; 76 contractual provisions that interfere with a debtor’s ability to obtain new ﬁnancing are thus inherently suspect. Given the conﬂict between loan prohibitions and the purpose of Chapter 11, a statutory prohibition
is justiﬁed. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that a provision in current law that
precludes debtors from invoking prebankruptcy commitments by a lender to
extend credit should be repealed.77 Making both of these adjustments would
have a salutary eﬀect on access to ﬁnancing in bankruptcy.
Even in the absence of legislative reform, bankruptcy judges could address
the problem by refusing to enforce loan prohibitions in most or all cases.
Courts should override the provisions unless there is clear evidence the loan
would be used to divert value from the ﬁrst lienholders or other lenders that
invoke the prohibition. 78
B. The Chilling Eﬀect of Restructuring Support Agreements
The second impediment to a competitive DIP ﬁnancing market is more
subtle and diﬃcult to police. In many current bankruptcies, the parties enter
into RSAs with key creditors before ﬁling for bankruptcy. 79 The RSA commits
its signatories to support a reorganization plan consistent with the terms outlined in the RSA. 80 RSAs provide a variety of important beneﬁts, such as enhancing coordination among the debtor and its creditors by committing the
signatories to requiring that anyone who buys a claim from them also honor
the RSA. Absent an RSA, a deal that had been carefully negotiated might fall
apart if enough of the signatories sold their claims to other investors. 81
Although o�en beneﬁcial, RSAs sometimes have problematic features.
They may be unjustiﬁably coercive, for instance, or give excessive fees to fa-

76.

For a discussion of the importance of liquidity and features of bankruptcy law that increase
access to liquidity, see Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 43; George G. Triantis, Financial Slack Policy and the Laws of Secured Transactions, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 35, 66 (2000).

77.

Id. at 1608-09.
78. This approach would, in a sense, be similar to courts’ treatment of stay waivers, though with
a stronger presumption against enforcement.
79. If the agreement is entered into during bankruptcy rather than before the ﬁling, it is o�en
called a plan support agreement (PSA) rather than an RSA. RSAs and PSAs are described in
detail in David A. Skeel Jr., Distorted Choice in Corporate Bankruptcy, 130 YALE L.J. 366, 378-81
(2020).
80. Id. at 370.
81.

Id. at 385 (discussing the signiﬁcance of this risk given the extensive amount of claims trading in current cases).
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vored parties. 82 Another feature of many RSAs is of particular concern here.
Like the loan prohibitions discussed in the last section, an RSA may preclude
potential lenders from oﬀering bankruptcy ﬁnancing. At ﬁrst glance, one might
doubt that a potential lender would sign an RSA if the lender would lose the
opportunity to make a proﬁtable loan as a result. But RSAs o�en give signing
fees to their signatories; 83 the prospect of receiving a signing fee may therefore
persuade the lender to forgo oﬀering alternative ﬁnancing.
The favored insider ﬁnancing in Neiman Marcus was linked to an RSA in
precisely this way. As Neiman’s ﬁnancial advisor put it in his declaration supporting the ﬁnancing request, the DIP ﬁnancing agreement, the RSA, and a related agreement were “integrated and intertwined.” 84 Lenders who wished to
participate in the $675 million DIP ﬁnancing were required to sign the RSA, 85
which dictated the path of the Chapter 11 case, committing the parties to a
prompt recapitalization that would give control to the lender groups that provided the DIP ﬁnancing. Signatories of the RSA would receive lucrative fees for
agreeing to “backstop”—that is, to purchase any portion of a planned loan or
issuance of stock that the debtor is unable to ﬁnd investors for—the DIP ﬁnancing and $75 million in additional ﬁnancing when Neiman exited Chapter
11. 86
The RSA and DIP ﬁnancing arrangement created two major impediments
to alternative insider-ﬁnancing oﬀers. First, the preferred lenders minimized
the risk of competition by locking up the vast majority of Neiman’s current
82.

These concerns are discussed in detail in id. at 395-405, which oﬀers rules of thumb to courts
for scrutinizing RSAs.
83. Id. at 398-99.
84.

85.

The other related agreement was an Exit Facility. Declaration of Tyler W. Cowan in Support
of the Debtors’ Emergency Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing
the Debtors to (A) Obtain Postpetition Financing and (B) Utilize Cash Collateral, (II)
Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties, (III) Modifying the Automatic
Stay, (IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing, and (V) Granting Related Relief at 10, In re Neiman
Marcus Grp., No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 7, 2020) [hereina�er Cowan Declaration].

See, e.g., Superpriority Senior Secured Debtor-In-Possession Term Loan Credit Facility
Backstop Commitment Letter 2 (May 7, 2020), in Neiman Marcus DIP Financing Motion,
supra note 49, at 308, 309.
86. “The Restructuring Support Agreement provides commitments from the Term Loan Lender
Group . . . and the Noteholder Group to backstop the proposed $675 million new-money
debtor in possession ﬁnancing facility (the ‘DIP Facility’), provide a $750 million exit ﬁnancing facility (the ‘Exit Facility’), and support implementation of [the proposed] chapter
11 plan . . . . Importantly, the DIP Lenders have agreed to provide the Prepetition Term Loan
Lenders, the holders of the Second Lien Notes, the holders of the 2028 Debentures, and the
holders of the Third Lien Notes with an opportunity to participate in the DIP Facility and
Exit Facility if they sign the Restructuring Support Agreement.” Neiman Marcus DIP Financing Motion, supra note 49, at 3-4.
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lenders. Of the three principal lender groups, 78% of the ﬁrst, 99% of the second, and 70% of the third were signatories of the RSA and thus could not oﬀer
alternative ﬁnancing. 87 This signiﬁcantly reduced the number of inside lenders
that could plausibly bid against the preferred ﬁnancing oﬀer.
Second, and related, an inside lender that wished to make an alternativeﬁnancing oﬀer would be forced to forgo the lucrative backstopping fees. The
form of the fees implicitly precluded an inside lender from both signing the
RSA and making an alternative-ﬁnancing oﬀer, since signatories to the RSA received their compensation in the form of fees for backstopping the preferred
ﬁnancing. If the RSA oﬀered cash fees to signatories, by contrast, it would be
logically possible both to participate in the RSA and to oﬀer alternative ﬁnancing. But this distinction ultimately makes little diﬀerence: either way, the RSA
had multiple terms that would be violated if a signatory sought to provide alternative ﬁnancing. RSA signatories were required to “support the Restructuring Transactions,” 88 and were not permitted to “object to, delay, impede, or take
any other action to interfere with acceptance, implementation, or consummation of the Restructuring Transactions,” or to “propose, ﬁle, support, or vote
for any Alternative Restructuring Proposal.” 89 Lenders that signed the RSA
thus gave up the right to oﬀer alternative ﬁnancing.
Given these impediments to challenging the favored inside DIP ﬁnancing
proposal, it is quite surprising that a competing bid nevertheless emerged.
Mudrick appears to have been excluded from the negotiations on the preferred
ﬁnancing. 90 Neiman and the preferred lenders may have assumed that the large
percentage of lenders included in the favored bid would discourage competitors.
In its response to the Mudrick oﬀer, Neiman emphasized the fact that the
Mudrick lenders held only a minority of the major existing debt—not enough
to control a vote of the existing lenders whether to agree to a priming lien for
Mudrick’s alternative ﬁnancing—and that the proposal would therefore require
a nonconsensual priming of the existing lenders. “[T]he Debtors received a

87.

Id. at 3.

88.

Declaration of Mark Weinstein, Chief Restructuring Oﬃcer of Neiman Marcus Group Ltd
LLL, in Support of the Debtors’ Emergency Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders
(I) Authorizing the Debtors to (A) Obtain Postpetition Financing and (B) Utilize Cash Collateral, (II) Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties, (III) Modifying
the Automatic Stay, (IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing, and (V) Granting Related Relief at 15
app. B § 4.01(a)(i), In re Neiman Marcus Grp., No. 20-32519 (May 7, 2020) [hereina�er
Neiman RSA].
89. Id. at 16.
90.

See Mudrick Objection, supra note 2, at 8-9 (describing Mudrick’s exclusion and eﬀorts to
participate).
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competing proposal from a group of term loan lenders [i.e., the Mudrick
group] that did not collectively hold greater than 50% of outstanding term
loans, the requisite amount to achieve consent under the Term Loan Facility,”
according to Neiman’s ﬁnancial advisor. 91 “As a result, the proposal would have
required nonconsensual priming of existing term loan lenders with little to no
remaining unencumbered collateral to oﬀer to primed term loan lenders as adequate protection.” 92
Neiman Marcus would have been a good opportunity for a court to grant a
nonconsensual priming lien, or at the least to have given it more serious consideration. The willingness of the existing lenders to provide $675 million of
new ﬁnancing secured by their existing liens suggests that Neiman’s assets
were valuable enough to support signiﬁcant new lending. Perhaps the Mudrick
proposal was too ﬂawed, but it was signiﬁcantly cheaper. The court could have
devoted a hearing speciﬁcally to the question of whether Neiman’s assets were
suﬃcient to assure adequate protection of the existing lenders in the context of
a priming lien.
The Neiman experience also suggests that courts should scrutinize RSAs
that are linked to DIP ﬁnancing especially closely if they are likely to discourage
competing loans from within the capital stack. 93 Because it locked up substantial majorities of the current lenders, the Neiman RSA was particularly suspect.
In its objection, Mudrick stridently insisted that the backstop fees bore no relation to any value the backstoppers were providing, because there was little risk
the backstop would be needed and the fee would be paid in steeply discounted
stock. 94 If this is correct, the court should have balked at the fees. 95 Policing ex-

91.
92.

93.
94.

95.

334

Cowan Declaration, supra note 84, at 11.
Id. Neiman sounded the same themes in its motion for approval of the ﬁnancing. See
Neiman Marcus DIP Financing Motion, supra note 49, at 5 (“[T]he proposal required a protracted, costly, and diﬃcult priming ﬁght at the outset of these chapter 11 cases with little
chance at success when the Debtors should be focused on stabilizing their operations and
building further consensus . . . .”); id. at 32 (similar language); id. at 35-36 (similar language).
In a recent article on RSAs, I noted this issue but did not directly address it. Skeel, supra
note 79, at 371 n.15. This Essay extends the analysis of that article.
The backstop fees were paid in newly issued stock of the reorganized company at a 35% discount to the expected value of the stock. Mudrick argued, “Where, as here, it is a virtual certainty that all who will receive rights are going to exercise them, there is no need for any
backstop or payment of accompanying fees—much less the astronomical backstop fees that
the Backstop Parties seek to extract from the estate here.” Mudrick Objection, supra note 2, at
14 (footnote omitted).
For an argument that rights oﬀerings, which include similar backstopping fees, should be
policed for reasonableness, see Shelby V. Saxon, Chapter 11 Rights Oﬀerings and Private
Placements: How Creditors Can Strike a Windfall, 94 AM. BANKR. L.J. 357 (2020).
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cessive fees would diminish the pressure for lenders to join a favored deal and
increase the likelihood of competition from other inside lenders.
Another strategy for addressing the chilling eﬀect of RSAs would be more
intrusive, though it too would not require legislative change. Courts could forbid parties from using an RSA to prevent inside lenders from oﬀering alternative ﬁnancing, thus disentangling DIP ﬁnancing from the RSA. This would be
diﬃcult to do if an RSA fee is directly linked to the DIP ﬁnancing, as it was in
Neiman. But if an RSA signatory wished to oﬀer alternative ﬁnancing, the
court could require that the signatory be permitted to participate in the RSA
(and fees linked to the RSA) if its ﬁnancing oﬀer did not prevail. In contexts
where the RSA fee is not linked directly to DIP ﬁnancing, a court could make
clear that it would not enforce an RSA covenant that treats an alternative DIP
ﬁnancing oﬀer as an event of default under the RSA.
I have focused primarily on judicial correctives, in part due to the greater
ease of implementation. Courts can intervene immediately, whereas legislation
is much more uncertain, especially given that the ﬂaws in the bankruptcylending market may not seem suﬃciently urgent to capture lawmakers’ attention. Attempting to remedy these frictions legislatively is also more likely to
have unintended consequences than case-by-case intervention by courts.
Despite the advantages of judicial oversight, the chilling eﬀect of RSAs on
competitive lending also could be addressed legislatively. Indeed, the prohibition on provisions that prevent potential lenders from oﬀering bankruptcy ﬁnancing, as discussed earlier, 96 could easily be made broad enough to invalidate
RSAs to the extent that they prevent potential lenders from oﬀering alternative
ﬁnancing.
* * *
Although the fragmented capital structure of many current debtors is
grounds for optimism about the trajectory of the DIP ﬁnancing market, especially if the impediments to competition in this market are addressed, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the developments I have focused on.
The increased competition among inside lenders that the Essay identiﬁes and
seeks to encourage will only occur with ﬁrms that have multiple lenders. Firms
that ﬁt the traditional paradigm of relying on a single bank lender for ﬁnancing, as most smaller corporations still do, will not have the option of seeking
funding from an alternative inside lender. These smaller ﬁrms already are
much less likely to obtain DIP ﬁnancing, and much less likely to reorganize,
than large corporations. 97 Under ordinary circumstances, these outcomes may
96.

See supra Section III.A.

97.

In a recent analysis, Peter Conti-Brown and I found that “73.49% of companies with over
$200 million in assets and 61.94% of companies with assets of $100-200 million obtained
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not be problematic, since few small ﬁrms appear to be viable when they ﬁle for
bankruptcy. But in the event of a crisis that causes even viable ﬁrms to default,
additional intervention may be needed to assure that these viable ﬁrms have access to the funding they need in bankruptcy. 98
conclusion
From a bankruptcy perspective, the pandemic had an unexpected silver lining: it revealed that a potential solution to the DIP ﬁnancing market’s serious
deﬁciencies is right in front of us. Rather than looking for ways to entice outside lenders to provide more competition for DIP ﬁnancing, inside lenders may
more eﬀectively serve this role. A�er all, they suﬀer far less from the information asymmetry that discourages outside lenders from competing with a favored inside lender.
Although competing bidders are already emerging, as in the Neiman Marcus case, they face signiﬁcant obstacles, including courts’ reluctance to grant
them nonconsensual priming liens and contractual provisions that forbid potential lenders from oﬀering an alternative source of ﬁnancing. In addition to
identifying these concerns, this Essay has considered how courts and Congress
could remove them. Bankruptcy courts need to be more open to priming
liens—and as more competing bids emerge, there is some hope they will be—
and they should invalidate RSA provisions that interfere with potential alternative-ﬁnancing oﬀers. Bankruptcy law should be amended to bar loan prohibitions. Increasing competition in the bankruptcy-ﬁnancing market would reduce the cost of credit for bankruptcy debtors, and it would remove one of the
most glaring current impediments to an eﬃcient reorganization process.
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bankruptcy ﬁnancing, whereas only 27.58% of companies with assets of $10-50 million and
4.06% with less than $10 million of assets did.” Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel, Credit
Markets and the (Fed’s) Visible Hand 24-25 (July 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle
with author).
98.
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For an argument that the Federal Reserve’s discount window could be used to facilitate
bankruptcy ﬁnancing for small and medium-sized businesses, see id.

